

Po drugie, potencjalna efektywność monopolii alkoholowych jest powiązana z intencją działania monopolu. W wielu stanach administrowanie monopolem, włączając dni i godziny sprzedaży, ceny detaliczne, ograniczenia reklamy są celowymi wysiłkami na rzecz ograniczenia konsumpcji. Bez tej intencji, staje się możliwym, iż monopol stanowy będzie wyglądać podobnie jak system prywatnego licencjonowania jeśli chodzi o potencjalne efekty w zakresie problemów alkoholowych.

W teorii, jeśli nałoży się na licencjonowane, prywatne placówki handlowe ograniczenia dotyczące ilości i lokalizacji, godzin i dni sprzedaży, cen detalicznych, reklamy i promocji alkoholu, można osiągnąć ten sam efekt ograniczenia konsumpcji alkoholu jak w przypadku systemu sprzedaży detalicznej kierowanego przez władze publiczne. Jednakże dochód jest podstawowym i naturalnym motywem prywatnych przedsiębiorców i stoi ponad wszystkimi ograniczeniami mającymi na celu obniżenie sprzedaży a zatem i dochodów. Zatem istnieje wewnętrzna sprzeczność pomiędzy zrozumiałą potrzebą uzyskiwania dochodu i potencjalnym wzrostem sprzedaży, a zatem i konsumpcji prowadzącej do zwiększenia problemów alkoholowych. W sieci sklepów detalicznych stanowiących własność państwa potencjalna skala tego konfliktu może zostać zredukowana, jeśli podstawowym celem monopolu nie jest zdobywanie dochodów, a troska o zdrowie i bezpieczeństwo publiczne.

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The State Monopoly as a Public Policy Approach to Consumption and Alcohol Problems: A Review of Research Evidence

Summary

First, the presence of alternative sources of alcohol, particularly cheaper alcohol, has a major impact on the potential effectiveness of the state monopoly.

Thus the general principle of the ability of monopoly situations to produce higher retail prices is reduced or even eliminated if the state sees alcohol sales as a means to derive government revenue. Since all profits and alcohol taxes come directly to the government, the state government may in fact net higher revenues with lower prices than if they administered a private licensing arrangement and obtained revenues only from excise taxes. In the U.S., where many of the state monopolies are viewed as revenue-generating approaches for the state government rather than an expression of public health concerns or alcohol policy, monopoly states can actually have lower prices. A good example is New Hampshire, with a state retail monopoly, which operates highly profitable (for New Hampshire) outlets on the border with Massachusetts (a license state with higher alcohol beverage taxes).

Second, the potential effectiveness of alcohol monopolies is related to the operational intention of the monopoly. In many countries the administration of the monopoly including its days and hours of sale, retail prices, and restriction on advertising are purposeful efforts to reduce consumption. Without this operational intent, it is possible that a government monopoly can look very much like a private license system in terms of its potential effect on alcohol problems.

In theory, if appropriate restrictions are placed upon privately-licensed establishments for number and location of outlets, hours and days of sales, retail price, and advertising and promotion of alcohol then the same potential effect of limiting alcohol consumption as a publically operated retail system could be achieved. However, profit is the primary and natural motivation of a privately owned business and all of the above restrictions do reduce sales and thus lower profits. Thus a built-in conflict exists between the understandable desire for profit and the potential for increased sales and thus consumption to produce higher alcohol problems. In a publically-owned retail system, the potential for this conflict can be reduced if its primary objective is a concern for public health and safety and not to derive income.

Piśmiennictwo

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